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The Blurry Line: Robert
Montgomery’s Public and Private
Interests as U.S. Consul to Alicante
Lawrence A. Peskin
Lawrence Peskin is grateful for the able assistance of Dr. Antonio J. Piqueres Diez in the Alicante
archives.
1 Robert Montgomery, a wealthy Irish-American merchant, became the United States’
first consul to Alicante, Spain in 1793. At that time, Nathaniel Cutting, assistant to the
American Minister to Spain to whom Montgomery would report, described him as a
“steady, active and zealous” friend to American interests. Four years later, Humphreys
himself wrote that Montgomery was the consul of which he had “heard more ill spoken
than any others” and “that he is by many others looked upon as a very self-interested
character;  and  by  some  as  a  man  destitute  of  principle.”1 These  contradictory
assessments may be a product of time; perhaps after four years as consul Montgomery’s
true colors became more visible. But they probably also reflect some fuzziness about
the role of a consul and, particularly, the problem of self-interest when the American
consular service was very new, very understaffed and very poor.
2 The tension between republican virtue and the perceived cosmopolitan self-interest of
the  British  court  was  at  the  heart  of  the  republican  critique  of  George III  that
underpinned the American Revolution, and, consequently the issue of interests was one
that Americans took very seriously. There appear to have been three potential areas
where consuls’ personal interests could pose a danger to the republic. The first was if
their loyalty was somehow co-opted by a foreign state. Consequently, many in Congress
hoped that consuls would be American citizens.2 However, in actuality it became clear
that  in  many  places  where  the  new  nation  hoped  to  develop  an  infrastructure  to
facilitate  trade,  most  notably  in  the  Mediterranean,  there  simply  were  not  enough
American  citizens  in  residence  or  willing  to  move  to  preclude  appointments  of
foreigners. In Spain, for example, other than Montgomery, the first American consuls
were all foreigners, mostly Irish or Scottish. A second sort of conflict of interest could
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occur when a consul violated the law for personal profit. For example, the American
consul  to  Marseilles  complained  that  the  consul  in  Genoa  had  “compromised  the
consular seal,  on the service of the United States during the siege of Genoa for his
private affairs.”3
3 While Montgomery was later accused of the former transgression and may possibly also
have indulged in the latter (though the evidence is not yet clear), it is a third type of
conflict of interest to which he appears to have been most closely tied –the conflict
between pursuing the national good and the aggressive pursuit of personal business
profits. When David Humphreys wrote that Montgomery was the most self-interested
consul,  he  placed James  Simpson,  a  Scotsman who had never  been to  America  but
served as U.S.  consul first to Gibraltar and then to Tangier at the other end of the
spectrum. Simpson appears never to have been a major merchant, and by the time he
reached his  salaried position in Tangier,  he had virtually no opportunity to pursue
mercantile  activity  due  to  the  paucity  of  shipping  there  in  the  1790s.  These  facts
suggest that, for Humphreys, the problem with Montgomery was his aggressive and
successful  merchant  house.  This  sort  of  conflict  between  personal  profit  and  the
national good was a much murkier type of conflict than the other two for early consuls
whose  jobs  involved  facilitating  and  increasing  national  trade,  because,  for  them,
personal profit and national gain often appeared to be closely aligned. 
4 Some  founding  fathers  hoped  that  the  new  nation’s  consuls  would  avoid  potential
conflicts of interest by avoiding mercantile activity altogether, and the original Franco-
American consular convention prohibited them from engaging in trade, as was the case
in the French consular system.4 However, as with the efforts to exclude foreigners from
the consulates, the reality of building a consular infrastructure undercut this idealistic
view. The impecunious early American legislatures consistently refused to offer consuls
any salary,  with the  exception of  those  in  the  Barbary states  of  Tunis,  Tripoli  and
Algiers.  The combination of  a  lack of  salary  and a  prohibition on mercantile  trade
would, according to one of the first American consuls, leave “no means of affording an
adequate support to persons who are properly qualified,” thereby removing “the only
inducement to accept the appointment.”5 Recognizing this difficulty, Congress almost
exclusively appointed merchants to the first consular posts. Some members of Congress
saw the use of merchants as a positive good rather than a necessary evil. John Adams
hoped  that  the  typical  consul  would  be  “an  American,  some  merchant  of  known
character, abilities, and industry, who would consent to serve his country for moderate
emoluments.”  Merchants,  presumably,  would demand only  “moderate  emoluments”
because they could support themselves through their business. Even so, Congress often
had problems inducing appointees to accept positions other than those in the busiest,
most lucrative ports such as Lisbon and Liverpool.6 Montgomery himself viewed the
appointment of merchants as beneficial to all, because “the more experienced a consul
in business, his knowledge and information must be the greater.” “And,” he continued,
“it will be more in his power to serve the country than those who are confined to the
simple vocation of their office and who for want of a proper [stimulus] seldom trouble
themselves about anything else.”7
5 Montgomery’s unusually successful business career is well  documented in American
and Spanish archives and, as a result, his case offers particularly useful insight into the
blurred  line  between  personal  and  national  interest.  Montgomery’s  career  falls
naturally  into  three  broad  periods.  From  his  arrival  in  Alicante  in  1777  until  his
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consular  appointment  in  1793  he  was  heavily  involved  in  overseas  trade,  most
lucratively  during  the  American  Revolution  when,  after  the  expulsion  of  British
merchants  from  Spain,  he  made  a  fortune  exporting  Spanish  barilla  into  the
Netherlands.8 His  consular  appointment came just  as  the French Revolutionary and
Napoleonic  Wars  lured  growing  numbers  of  neutral  American  ships  into  the
Mediterranean.  Taking  advantage  of  both  developments,  he  switched  to  the
commission trade and once again made large profits.  The Peninsular War, however,
destroyed that trade and, at first slowly and later rapidly, eroded his fortune. In an
attempt to counter these inexorable losses he moved out of the commission trade and
began purchasing agricultural land in larger quantities in and around Alicante from
1807 until his death in 1823.
6 The most fruitful period in Montgomery’s career to examine in order to get insight into
the conflict of interest question would be the second, when he was making substantial
profits as a commission merchant. However it is worth considering the pre-consular
years briefly.  During  this  period,  Montgomery  managed  to  make  contacts  with  a
remarkable number of influential American figures, including Benjamin Franklin, John
Jay, George Washington, William Bingham, and others. His excuse for doing so often
was to provide valuable information that would aid the United States. For example, in
August of 1788 he wrote to Secretary of Foreign Affairs John Jay to provide important
political news from Algiers, where the crews of two American ships were being held
captive and to offer to go there to negotiate a peace.9 No doubt there was an element of
patriotism  to  such  offers,  but  they  also  gave  Montgomery  an  excuse  to  begin
corresponding with the leaders of the new republic. He was not hesitant to milk these
connections, both in quest of consular positions in Algiers and Alicante and, in the case
of Jay, to try to find new merchant contacts to dispose of his shipments to New York.10
7 After receiving his consular appointment, Montgomery’s first actions were to appoint
vice consuls to Barcelona and Cartagena. Within the next two years he would appoint
three more vice consuls to Valencia, Benicarlo, and Santander.11 As with most of his
consular  activity,  these  appointments  can  be  viewed  either  as  intended  to  assist
American  trade  or  intended  to  assist  Montgomery’s  business,  depending  on  one’s
perspective. And, as is also the case with most of his actions, the first perspective is not
entirely  antithetical  to  the  second.  On  the  one  hand,  the  consular  service  was,  as
already noted, woefully understaffed. Having officials to assist merchants, captains, and
sailors  in  these  major  Spanish  ports  was  a  necessary  first  step  in  creating  an
infrastructure to support the new republic’s trade and a matter of stimulating further
commerce under the assumption that “if you build it they will come.”
8 However, it is also undeniable that developing this little network connecting the major
Spanish  ports  to  Alicante  also  benefitted  Montgomery,  the  only  resident  American
merchant there at that time. At a minimum, these merchant vice consuls would serve
as  important  commercial  contacts  for  Montgomery.  At  most,  a  cynic  might  see  a
potential  quid pro quo in that they would benefit  from their appointments (through
consular  fees  and  increased  likelihood  of  business  with  American  ships)  while
Montgomery could potentially benefit from their gratitude (through new commissions
directed to him and favorable terms of trade). At any rate, Spanish records show that
most of the appointees would become valuable contacts to Montgomery later on if that
was not already the case at the time of their appointment. The vice consul to Barcelona
was his brother, John Montgomery, who was also his once and future business partner.
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Thomas Vague, the appointee to Valencia was also appointed British vice-consul by
another  of  Montgomery’s  business  partners,  British consul  Daniel  Budd,  and would
continue to have a long-term trading relationship with Montgomery. Decades later, at
Vague’s death, Montgomery would appoint his partner, Francis de Llano, to replace
him  in  the  Valencia  post.12 The  Benicarlo  appointee,  Ricardo  Ryan,  a  young  Irish
merchant,  would  later  marry  Montgomery’s  daughter  and  purchase  some  of  his
property.13 Lewis  O’Brien,  the  Santander  appointee,  had  excellent  connections  to
English merchants (he was also the British vice consul) as well as American merchants
in Boston and the Italian and Scottish-born American consuls  to  Cadiz  and Malaga
respectively, all of which would have benefitted Montgomery as the two became more
closely acquainted.14
9 There  are  hints  that  contemporaries  might  have  viewed  such  appointments  with
suspicion. The Spanish officials certainly thought that Montgomery had far too much
power  to  appoint  vice  consuls  over  such a  wide  area  (Santander  is  500 miles  from
Alicante as the crow flies and much further by 18th century shipping routes). They also
bristled at his appointment of Ryan “durante tan solo mi voluntad,” (“as long as I will”)
which they felt interfered with the King’s authority to remove foreign officials.15 David
Humphreys  also  suspected  that  appointments  made  by  consuls  generally,  and
especially  by  Montgomery,  might  be  made  out  of  self-interest.  Immediately  after
voicing concern that Montgomery was trying to send a nephew to Algiers to set up a
branch of his merchant house there under the guise of negotiating a peace, Humphreys
wrote, “I question how far stress is to be laid upon the recommendations […] of consuls
who happen to be mercantile men themselves, of other persons for consuls, by whose
appointment they may be either directly or indirectly benefitted in their affairs.”16
10 Shortly  after  he  was  appointed  consul,  Montgomery  began  to  shift  his  focus  from
overseas trade to acting as a commission merchant who would broker deals between
owners of incoming ships and local merchants who could buy portions of the incoming
cargo and sell their own products as outgoing cargo. Montgomery typically claimed a
two percent commission for these deals. For the 1780s and early 1790s there is ample
evidence that Montgomery was personally involved in the barilla and bacalao trade and
in  the  sale  of  ships  with  correspondents  in  America,  England,  Ireland,  and  the
Netherlands. But I have not yet found a single piece of evidence that he was directly
involved in the overseas trade after his consular appointment, although his brother
John did continue to be involved in it.17
11 It  is  possible that this shift was partly an ethical issue. Some other consuls did not
believe that they and their colleagues should engage directly in overseas trade due to
the conflicts of interest it might create.18 However, considering Montgomery’s earlier
position  on  the  desirability  of  merchant-consuls  and  his  subsequent  aggressive
behavior as a commission merchant, it seems more likely that this transition was based
on financial calculation. The mid-1790s saw a remarkable increase in the number of
American ships entering Alicante, which was broadly consistent with the rise in the
American neutral trade throughout the Mediterranean after 1793 with the onset of the
French Revolution and subsequent warfare. The limited data on shipping shows that
while just twelve American ships entered Alicante in the last three years of the 1780s
combined, that same number entered in the single year of 1796. Traffic appears to have
grown rapidly thereafter, with 42 arriving in the peak year of 1803 and approximately
30 in each of the two subsequent years. These ships were primarily involved in the
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traditional Anglo-American trade of fish and grains to Mediterranean ports.19 As the
only American merchant in town until 1802 and with excellent mercantile connections
throughout eastern Spain from Santander to Malaga, Montgomery would have been in
an ideal position to benefit from this increased trade even if he were not the American
consul.
12 Being  consul,  however,  gave  Montgomery  a  number  of  other  advantages  as  a
commission merchant.  First  off,  the robust mercantile  network that he was able to
enter through his connections to other American consuls and vice consuls,  some of
whom he appointed himself,  was very valuable.  Consuls frequently sent business to
each  other  in  exchange  for  split  commissions.20 Beyond  that,  consuls  also  had
unparalleled  access  to  goods  and  information  arriving  in  their  ports.  In  theory,
captains were required to report to consuls to have their papers and cargoes examined.
American  consuls  often  complained  that  they  lacked  power  to  enforce  these
requirements, but captains nevertheless appear to have followed them fairly regularly.
21 Montgomery and other consuls submitted semi-annual reports of ship arrivals based
on  information  reported  by  captains.  And, after  passage  of  an  1803  act  to  protect
seamen, captains could face steep fines for failing to produce an accurate list of crew
members to consuls  when they arrived at  port.22 Consequently,  Montgomery would
likely have met nearly every American captain who arrived in Alicante and had an
opportunity to gain a commission from them.
13 Montgomery was known to be particularly aggressive in soliciting commissions. In 1798
Captain Henry Prince wrote in the logbook of the American ship Astrea that Alicante
commission merchants “have [a] very suspicious look after one another in business,
which keeps up a competition between them for the most part.” He added that the
greatest competition was between Montgomery and the British merchants Damasier
and  Stemberg  whom  he  described  as  “at  swordpoints”  to  get  commissions  form
American ships. According to Prince, when an unconsigned vessel arrived Montgomery
and his clerk would pull up alongside it in a boat “to enquire who does your business
with  the  greatest  pretentions  of  friendship.”  The  minute  the  unconsigned  vessel
landed, “clerks will attend you to his house and it is next to impossible of getting away
without engaging to dine with him.” At Montgomery’s house, “his wife will force you to
eat  in  such an  overbearing  manner  and insist  on  your  not  refusing  and in  such a
manner that one must affront her or kill himself with eating.” While he acknowledged
that “some may look upon such kind of people as very polite,” Prince’s opinion was that
their hospitality was “only to answer their own end.”23 If  this analysis was correct,
Montgomery was taking advantage of the public hospitality a consul would be expected
to provide his countrymen to secure commissions. But, as Prince acknowledged, the
line between self-interest and hospitality in this case was not the clearest.
14 Besides personal profit, Montgomery’s role as commission agent also helped extend his
personal and business network. Unfortunately, documentation of his business activities
during this period can be difficult to find as merchants who consigned their shipments
to him in advance would have done so in  their  home ports,  and the local  notarial
records have few examples of captains consigning goods on arrival,  suggesting that
often times these arrangements were not formerly notarized.24 An agreement with the
Boston firm of Caleb Loring and Thomas Curtis serves as a rare example. In 1801 Loring
and Curtis dictated a power of attorney that gave Montgomery’s firm, Roberto y Juan
Montgomery, broad powers to negotiate the disposal of the cargo of their ship, the
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Otter.  Although  the  power  of  attorney  did  not  spell  out  financial  terms,  the
Montgomerys  would  doubtless  have  received  their  usual  two  percent  commission,
which could be a windfall for the cargo of a large ship and, potentially, the sale of the
ship itself as suggested by Loring and Curtis.25
15 The connection to Loring and Curtis would also prove of value over the long term. They
were among an influential cadre of New England merchants who dominated American
trade  in  the  Mediterranean  and  had  the  power  to  recommend  the  Montgomerys’
services to others and the ability to consign multiple shipments. They also regularly
offered recommendations for individuals hoping to become American consuls.  They
and their peers viewed consuls more or less as merchants’ representatives abroad and
as such they felt a responsibility to see to it that capable and responsive men occupied
those positions. Loring signed a petition recommending Thomas Appleton as consul to
Paris in 1797.26 More relevant to Montgomery, in 1815 he and eight other merchants
wrote  a  letter  to  President  James  Madison  recommending  that  Obadiah  Rich  be
appointed consul to Malaga. Rich was not only a merchant who had previously lived in
Valencia, he was also the husband of Montgomery’s niece and an important member of
the extended Montgomery family.27
16 In fairness, the blurring of Montgomery’s personal and consular business was as much
a  result  of  weak,  if  not  derelict,  direction  on  the  part  of  the  young  U.S.  State
Department. Vague directives and extremely erratic communications from Washington
forced Montgomery and other consuls to improvise as they went along. Loring and the
merchants  who  wrote  recommendations  for  consular  candidates  viewed  them  as
representatives  of  American  nations  abroad  and  understood  their  task  to  be  to
facilitate American trade. This view more or less accorded with that of most consuls,
who were merchants themselves, and, at least, did not generally contradict what could
be discerned of the State Department’s views. Looked at this way, nearly everything
Montgomery  did  could  be  construed  to  benefit  American  commerce.  As  the  only
American there, he was in a good position either as commission merchant or consul to
guide  American  captains  and  supercargoes  through  the  intricacies  of  Spanish
commerce. He could speak English clearly to them and had a wide range of contacts
who might be willing to purchase their  shipments.  When they ran into trouble,  he
could offer assistance, or, as in the case of Loring and Curtis, when a ship consigned to
him ended up in a different port,  he could connect them to responsible Americans
there. Of course, all this came at a price in the form of commissions, consular fees, or
split commissions when he substituted another merchant for himself. Montgomery and
other consuls could, and doubtless did, argue that valuable assistance does not come
free, and that his services were well worth the expenses.
17 A  set  of  three  notarized  documents  from  1799  provides  some  insight  into  how
Montgomery  viewed  the  line  between  consular  and  personal.  Two  of  them  list
Montgomery as “consul of the American nation,” a designation that was hardly ever
used in Montgomery’s notarized documents. The first,  drawn up in February, was a
bond that Montgomery put up on behalf of the Captain and crew members of the U.S.
ship Hazard detained by authorities who suspected that a portion of their cargo was not
imported according to Spanish law.  The second,  notarized two months later,  was a
similar  case  in  which  an  American  Captain  with  a  cargo  of  cod  allegedly  had  not
received proper  authorization from the Spanish consul  in  Boston before  departing.
Montgomery, acting in his official consular capacity, gave security for the cargo while
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the matter was being cleared up.  In a third document,  Captain Robert Peele of  the
American ship Portland gave Montgomery power of attorney to resolve a conflict with
local authorities who had confiscated a large amount of Spanish money as well as some
silk seized from his ship on suspicion it had not been properly certified by a Spanish
consul.  Although  very  similar  to  the  previous  case,  in  this  document  the  notary
described Montgomery as a member of a merchant firm established in Alicante, not as
the American consul.28 
18 Why would Montgomery have been described as a consul in the first two documents
and not the third? Since the third document was created by the same notary who wrote
up the two previous documents, and in the same year, it could not have been a matter
of  notarial  style  or  ignorance.  One  difference  is  that,  unlike  in  the  first  two
transactions, Montgomery does not seem to have been present when Peele drew up his
power of attorney (Montgomery did not sign the document). Perhaps both Peele and
the  notary  viewed  the  disposition  of  the  Portland as  a  private  matter,  not  part  of
Montgomery’s official duties. Perhaps too, the fact that Montgomery put up his own
money in the previous cases (but not in Peele’s) prompted him to insist that he be
referred to as American consul in the hope that should he lose his money he could be
reimbursed by the State Department. Whatever the reason, the line between consular
and personal activity appears to have been very unclear to all involved.
19 Self-interest and national service blurred even more in other aspects of Montgomery’s
consular career. For example, he, like most other consuls, spent a good deal of effort
attempting to bring more American trade to his port. To do so, he, like most consuls,
attempted to improve the spread of  information about  trading opportunities,  often
including information on prices and demand in his reports to the Secretary of State,
presumably on the naive assumption that the State Department would spread this data
to American merchants. Montgomery, like most merchants, also sent such information,
usually in the form of price currents, to as many other merchants as he could. These
flyers, usually printed by the late 18th century, listed goods commonly sold in Alicante,
their current prices, and commission terms offered by Montgomery’s company. Some
recipients may have viewed the numerous solicitations they received as we look at junk
mail or cold calls today, but they performed an important role in informing merchants
of economic conditions around the world. There is ample evidence that Montgomery
sent printed price currents to merchants throughout the Mediterranean region and
America, and eventually he began enclosing them within his reports to the Secretary of
State as well.29
20 In  disseminating  all  of  this  information,  Montgomery  was  acting  exactly  as  most
merchants did whether they were consuls or not. Some of his consular reports could
have easily been mistaken for merchants’ letters by readers unaware of his position.
Does  this  mean that  he  was  a  self-interested  merchant?  To  a  large  extent  he  was,
insofar as bringing more ships carrying more saleable cargoes to Alicante increased the
number and profitability of commissions for him. But, increasing American trade in the
Mediterranean was surely  also  a  national  goal,  and Montgomery’s  interests  aligned
with the national agenda here. One could certainly argue in this case that self-interest
properly understood was a national virtue.
21 Montgomery also spent time and effort trying to prevent captures of American ships
and redeeming captured ships and sailors. As with the dissemination of information,
these activities served the good of the house of Montgomery as well as the good of the
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nation.  Montgomery  certainly  hoped  to  gain  some  personal  benefit  when  he
volunteered to negotiate peace with Morocco and Algiers. As already discussed, success
in that department could provide him with influential patrons at the highest levels of
the new nation’s government and potentially pave the way for his firm to get in on the
ground floor of business in those regions. Aware that Barbary consuls were the only
ones paid salaries by the United States, Montgomery also coveted an appointment to
Algiers which he believed he could hold while simultaneously maintaining his business
in  Alicante.  But,  more  generally,  captured  ships  were  a  serious  impediment  to  all
mercantile activity. Algerian captures of American ships in the 1780s and 1790s posed
an existential threat to American shipping in Alicante and the Mediterranean, as did
French captures in the late 1790s and after 1807.30 Lessening these threats benefited
everyone  involved  in  American  trade.  Certainly  the  period  between 1795  and 1807
when American shipping in eastern Spain was more or less liberated from both threats
was the period of maximum prosperity for American business in the region and one of
the most profitable periods for Montgomery personally.
22 Unfortunately  for  Montgomery  and  others  in  the  region,  after  1807  commercial
prosperity began to slip away. The chief culprit was the Peninsular War, which both cut
off shipping and devastated much of the region. By 1816 Montgomery claimed to have
lost at least $200,000, and conditions only got worse before his death in 1823.31 With
shipping at  a  standstill,  there  were no commissions  and no profits  for  commission
merchants. As a result, preliminary indications are that Montgomery began investing
more heavily in agricultural land, becoming a landed gentleman and wine producer. He
spent  a  good  deal  of  effort  trying  to  work  with  Spanish  authorities  to  encourage
American shipping (or discourage it  less) with little success.  The dearth of business
activity and absence of other Americans provided few opportunities for conflicts of
interest. Montgomery tried to use his government connections to get himself and his
children  posts  in  Marseilles  with  limited  success.  He  also  hoped  his  position  as
American consul would protect him from depredations by French or Spanish troops,
but ultimately it did not. He died in the middle of a crisis induced by French troops who
would  ultimately  seize  much  of  the  property  he  and  his  family  had  acquired  in
purchases of former church lands.32
23 In  the  end Montgomery’s  story  may do  more  to  point  to  the  difficulty  in  defining
conflicts of interest for early American consuls than anything else.  The question of
whether he was out for himself or his country appears to offer a false dichotomy. So far
there is no evidence that he engaged in illegal activity or was guilty of any crimes other
than aggressive networking, trading and solicitation of commissions. In other words,
he acted within the acceptable bounds for successful merchants. What is perhaps most
remarkable is the extent to which he was able to make his consular position profitable
within  legally  (if  not  always  socially)  acceptable  norms.  Montgomery’s  success  also
provides a good example of  how the young U.S.  government could successfully use
private interests to arrive at public goods. This strategy was vital for cash strapped
governments domestically as well as abroad. Early state governments frequently issued
corporate charters and provided other incentives to private companies willing to fund
internal improvements or build factories in the expanding interior.33 The question then
and now was who benefitted from whom, or in contemporary terms, whether the tail
wagged the dog or vice versa. Just as that question had no clear answer domestically, it
does not appear easily answerable in the case of Montgomery or most other consuls.
But what does appear quite  clearly,  is  the tight interweaving of  public  and private
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interests  that  characterized  all  aspects  of  early  American  government  despite  the
republican  revolutionary  rhetoric  that  demonized  self-interest and  glorified
disinterested virtue.
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ABSTRACTS
This  essay,  based  on  intensive  research  in  American  and  Spanish  documents,  addresses  the
problem of self-interest on two fronts.  First,  it  examines the business and consular career of
Robert Montgomery, American consul to Alicante, Spain, from 1793 to 1823. As a commission
merchant, Montgomery was able to profit from his consular position in many ways. But more
importantly, it questions the very nature of the problem of self-interest, arguing that the line
between self-interest and national service was very blurry and perhaps impossible to delineate.
American merchants and the consuls who represented them believed that what was in their
interest was also in the interest of American commerce, and a weak and impoverished State
Department, unable to send out professional diplomats to most ports or even pay salaries, largely
agreed. 
Cet  article,  basé  sur  des  recherches  intensives  dans  des  archives  américaines  et  espagnoles,
aborde  le  problème  de  l’intérêt  personnel  sur  deux  fronts.  D’abord,  il  examine  la  carrière
commerciale et consulaire de Robert Montgomery, consul américain de 1793 à 1823 à Alicante, en
Espagne.  Négociant  en  commission,  Montgomery  a  pu profiter  de  sa  position  consulaire  de
plusieurs façons. Mais, plus important encore, l’article remet en question la nature même du
problème de l’intérêt personnel, en faisant valoir que la frontière entre l’intérêt personnel et le
service national était très floue, et peut-être impossible à délimiter. Les négociants américains et
les  consuls  qui  les  représentaient  pensaient  que  ce  qui  était  dans  l’intérêt  du  commerce
américain  était  aussi  dans  leur  propre  intérêt,  et  le  département  d’État,  faible  et  appauvri,
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incapable d’envoyer des diplomates professionnels dans la plupart des ports ou même de payer
les salaires, était largement d’accord.
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